Preschoolers negatively evaluate conventional norm violations in pretend play.

A growing body of research demonstrates that children's pretend play is largely influenced by their understanding of reality. The current work took a novel approach to testing children's understanding of pretense by investigating whether children apply and uphold their knowledge of conventional norms in pretend play. In this study, 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 200) were introduced to a series of pretend play scenarios (e.g., pretending to eat breakfast) in which a puppet pretended to follow a norm (e.g., pretended to eat cereal for breakfast) or violate a norm (e.g., pretended to eat a hamburger for breakfast). These pretend play scenarios were presented as either fantastical or realistic in nature. Consistent with our hypotheses, children evaluated pretend norm violation more negatively than pretend norm adherence and reported liking norm violators less than norm followers. Contrary to our hypothesis, the manipulation of play context (fantastical vs. realistic) did not affect children's evaluations. That is, children were just as negative about pretend norm violations (relative to pretend norm adherence) in fantastical pretend play scenarios as they were in realistic pretend play scenarios. Furthermore, individual differences in children's fantasy orientation did not predict their evaluations. This study is the first to establish that children maintain their real-world understanding of conventional norms in pretend play, providing further evidence that children's pretense is largely realistic in nature.

Is or ought? Reactions to violations help children to distinguish norms and regularities.

Humans have a natural tendency to treat regularities (what people often do) as norms (what people ought to do). This tendency to move from is to ought introduces bias into our social reasoning because nonconformity to regularities is treated as wrong rather than uncommon. How then can children distinguish norms and regularities? This study investigated whether children use others' distinct reactions to violations of norms and regularities to distinguish the two. Children (103 4- to 8-year-olds) observed a group of demonstrators consistently use one pathway of a novel apparatus, establishing it as the conforming pathway. Then, an additional demonstrator used an alternative (i.e., violating) pathway while bystanders reacted to the violation. In the Norm condition (n = 48) bystanders were visibly irritated and disapproving of the violation, whereas in the Regularity condition (n = 55) bystanders were surprised or confused but ultimately accepting of the violation. Children then completed three tasks in which they used the apparatus themselves, observed a puppet using the violating pathway, and evaluated the wrongness of using the violating pathway on a Likert scale. Children used the conforming pathway more often in the Norm condition than in the Regularity condition, disapproved of violations more in the Norm condition than in the Regularity condition, and rated violations as more impermissible in the Norm condition than in the Regularity condition. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that children use others' reactions when distinguishing norms and regularities.

Social statistics: Children use statistical reasoning to guide their inferences about the scope of social behavior.

To acquire social conventional knowledge, children must distinguish between behaviors that are practiced by groups of people versus those that are practiced by individuals. How do children infer the scope (i.e., level of generality) of social behavior? Prior work has addressed this question by focusing on the cues or instruction that adults provide to children. The current research takes a novel approach by examining whether children form scope inferences on the basis of statistical evidence alone. Two studies with 4- to 5-year-olds (N = 70) and 7- to 8-year-olds (N = 40) investigated whether children track and integrate different forms of statistical evidence to infer the scope of social behaviors. Children were presented with combinations of frequency evidence (i.e., constancy of a behavior) and negative evidence (i.e., an alternative behavior) that together indicated whether a behavior was practiced by a wide group of people, a narrower group of people, or a specific individual. Children's inferences about who else would demonstrate a behavior were consistent with the evidence they observed, though younger children required a more supportive version of the task. To support their inferences for shared behaviors, older children provided conventional explanations whereas younger children often provided psychological explanations. Together, the findings suggest an alternative account of how children acquire social conventional knowledge above and beyond any direct instruction or overt social cues provided by adults. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Developmental changes in children's normative reasoning across learning contexts and collaborative roles.

What influences children's normative judgments of conventional rules at different points in development? The current study explored the effects of two contextual factors on children's normative reasoning: the way in which the rules were learned and whether the rules apply to the self or others. Peer dyads practiced a novel collaborative board game comprising two complementary roles. Dyads were either taught both the prescriptive (i.e., what to do) and proscriptive (i.e., what not to do) forms of the rules, taught only the prescriptive form of the rules, or created the rules themselves. Children then judged whether third parties were violating or conforming to the rules governing their own roles and their partner's roles. Early school-aged children's (6- to 7-year-olds; N = 60) normative judgments were strongest when they had been taught the rules (with or without the proscriptive form), but were more flexible for rules they created themselves. Preschool-aged children's (4- to 5-year-olds; N = 60) normative judgments, however, were strongest when they were taught both the prescriptive and proscriptive forms of the rules. Additionally, preschoolers exhibited stronger normative judgments when the rules governed their own roles rather than their partner's roles, whereas school-aged children treated all rules as equally normative. These results demonstrate that children's normative reasoning is contingent on contextual factors of the learning environment and, moreover, highlight 2 specific areas in which children's inferences about the normativity of conventions strengthen over development. (PsycINFO Database Record

Leave Her out of It: Person-Presentation of Strategies is Harmful for Transfer.

A common practice in textbooks is to introduce concepts or strategies in association with specific people. This practice aligns with research suggesting that using "real-world" contexts in textbooks increases students' motivation and engagement. However, other research suggests this practice may interfere with transfer by distracting students or leading them to tie new knowledge too closely to the original learning context. The current study investigates the effects on learning and transfer of connecting mathematics strategies to specific people. A total of 180 college students were presented with an example of a problem-solving strategy that was either linked with a specific person (e.g., "Juan's strategy") or presented without a person. Students who saw the example without a person were more likely to correctly transfer the novel strategy to new problems than students who saw the example presented with a person. These findings are the first evidence that using people to present new strategies is harmful for learning and transfer.

When you've seen one, have you seen them all? Children's memory for general and specific learning episodes.

In any learning situation, children must decide the level of generality with which to encode information. Cues to generality may affect children's memory for different components of a learning episode. In this research, we investigated whether 1 cue to generality, generic language, affects children's memory for information about social categories and specific individuals. In Study 1, preschool-aged children (n = 40), but not school-aged children (n = 40), remembered generic properties more often than analogous, nongeneric properties but remembered the individual category exemplars associated with nongeneric properties more often than those associated with generic properties. In Study 2, school-aged children (n = 26) did not show differential memory for generic and nongeneric learning episodes, even when task demands were increased. Additionally, both younger and older children generalized generic properties significantly more than nongeneric properties. These findings reflect an early understanding of the category relevance of generics and suggest that the effect of generic language on memory declines over development. However, generic language has a consistent and powerful influence on children's within-category generalization.

Property content guides children's memory for social learning episodes.

How do children's interpretations of the generality of learning episodes affect what they encode? In the present studies, we investigated the hypothesis that children encode distinct aspects of learning episodes containing generalizable and non-generalizable properties. Two studies with preschool (N=50) and young school-aged children (N=49) reveal that their encoding is contingent on the generalizability of the property they are learning. Children remembered generalizable properties (e.g., morphological or normative properties) more than non-generalizable properties (e.g., historical events or preferences). Conversely, they remembered category exemplars associated with non-generalizable properties more than category exemplars associated with generalizable properties. The findings highlight the utility of remembering distinct aspects of social learning episodes for children's future generalization.